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2017-05-21

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Potential growth is exogenous if one assumes, as is commonly done, that the alarming crisis of U.S. productivity growth crisis is exclusively due to supply-side factors such as excessive (labor market) regulation, undue business taxes, an insufficiently skilled labor force, and too little competition (also from abroad). Demand does not matter in the long run and hence the TFP growth crisis cannot be lastingly cured by fiscal stimulus (as Trump seems to propose), higher real wages, or a restructuring of the private debt overhang. In this view, because demand is side-lined, rising inequality, growing polarization and the vanishing middle class play no role whatsoever as drivers of slow potential growth. They simply drop out of the story. I think this is wrong.

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The U.S. economy is suffering from two interrelated diseases: the secular stagnation of its potential growth, and the polarization of jobs and incomes. The two disorders have a common root in the demand shortfall, originating from the ��unbalanced�� growth between technologically ��dynamic�� and ��stagnant�� sectors, which—crucially—is bringing down potential growth. To understand how the short-run demand shortfall carries over into the long run, we must first rethink the Solow residual, which economic textbooks define as the best available measure of the underlying pace of exogenous innovation and Hicks-neutral technological change (Furman 2015). But it can be shown, using national-income accounting, that there is no such thing as a Solow residual, because it must equal—as a matter of accounting identity—either ��weighted-factor-payments�� growth or ��weighted-factor-productivities�� growth. My empirical analysis using BEA data for the period 1948-2015 shows that this is the case, bringing out that the secular decline in aggregate U.S. TFP growth is due primarily to secular declines in aggregate real wage growth and aggregate labor productivity growth.

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The question is what causes these. I argue in a new working paper that on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the suppression of U.S. real wage growth—what Alan Greenspan called the ��atypical restraint on compensation increases [that] has been evident for a few years now and appears to be mainly the consequence of greater worker insecurity��—has been the main driver of faltering labor productivity growth and hence of TFP growth as well. This influence of wage growth on productivity growth can be alternatively explained as ��induced technical change��, ��Marx-biased technical change��, or ��directed technical change��—but the key mechanism is just this: rising real wages, as during the period 1948-1972, provide an incentive for firms to invest in labor-saving machinery and productivity growth will surge as a result; but when labor is cheap, as during most of the period 1972-2015, businesses have little incentive to invest in the modernization of their capital stock and productivity growth falters as a consequence (Storm and Naastepad 2012). Globalization enabled the establishment of this low-wage-growth regime, in combination with domestic labor market deregulation and de-unionization. Financial globalization, in addition, enabled the rich to have their cake (profits) and eat it (by channeling them to offshore tax havens or into derivative financial instruments). In this way, trade and financial globalization have been essential building blocks of the dual economy (Temin 2017).

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But the story so far is by no means complete. My growth accounting analysis for the U.S. economy during 1948-2015 shows that the slowdown in aggregate productivity growth is hiding from view a growing divergence in productivity performance and technological zing between a ��dynamic�� sector (which includes ��Manufacturing��, ��Information��, FIRE and ��Professional Business Services��) and a ��stagnant�� sector (which includes ��Utilities & Construction��, ��Educational, Health & Private Social Services�� and the ��Rest��, made up of fast-food services, arts & entertainment, recreational and other services).

The growing segmentation suggests a Baumol-like pattern of ��unbalanced growth�� between a technologically ��dynamic�� sector, which is shedding jobs and workers, and a ��stagnant�� and ��survivalist�� sector which acts as an ��employer of last resort��. The growing segmentation between these sectors leads to a structural shortfall of aggregate demand, as workers shift from higher-paid dynamic to lower-paid stagnant activities, and this employment shift depresses labor productivity and real wage growth in stagnant activities. Demand growth, when lowered over a long enough period of time, starts to depress dynamic-sector productivity growth as well, hence aggregate potential growth comes down. Unbalanced growth causes premature stagnation.

Following this logic, the intentional creation of a structurally low-wage-growth economy, post 1980, has not just kept inflation and interest rates low and led to workers ��traumatized by job insecurity�� (in Greenspan��s words) accepting ��mediocre jobs�� in the stagnant sector—it has also slowed down capital deepening, the further division of labor, and the rate of labor-saving technical progress in the dynamic core. Hence, through the well-known Kaldor-Verdoorn effect, productivity growth in the dynamic sector has been depressed as well (see Basu & Foley 2013 for evidence for the U.S. on this relation).

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Their mistake is to lopsidedly assume that potential output growth is determined by the inexorably exogenous factors of ��technology�� and ��demography��, while demand growth is simply irrelevant in the long run. It is high time to write off the intellectual sunk capital invested in this—mistaken—belief—if only because on present dualizing trends the U.S. economy cannot preserve its social and political legitimacy for long.

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Macroeconomics Beyond the NAIRU

Macroeconomics Beyond the NAIRU

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hyapehyape 2017/05/21 19:23 10ǯ�ʾ����ε������Τ褦�ʤ��Τ��ޤ����������Ƥ��롩
https://www.boj.or.jp/research/wps_rev/wps_2006/data/wp06j01.pdf

2017-05-20

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Econospeak��ProGrowthLiberal��PGL�ˤ������󥶥�Ϣ���������������������硼���ΰʲ���ȯ�����Ҳ𤷤Ƥ�����

Keeping monetary policy easy to achieve higher inflation has the potential to push rents still higher, negatively affecting a large percentage of households. Consequently, I am not as enthusiastic or encouraged as some when I see inflation moving higher, especially when it has been driven by a sector like housing. Inflation is a tax and those least able to afford it generally suffer the most.

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First, the people who are denied work as a result of higher interest rates will be disproportionately those at the bottom of the ladder: African Americans, Hispanics, and workers with less education. Furthermore, higher unemployment rates mean that the workers who have jobs will have less bargaining power and be less able to push up their wages. It's hard to see how people who lose jobs and get lower pay increases will benefit from a slightly lower inflation rate. The other reason why the argument doesn't quite work is that even the modest inflation we have seen in recent years is driven almost entirely by rising rents. Higher interest rates could actually make rental inflation worse. An immediate effect of higher interest rates is lower construction. This will reduce the supply of housing in cities with rapidly rising rents, making the shortage of housing units worse. This will compound the negative effect of reduced labor market opportunities. That hardly seems like a winning policy option for the poor.

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������PGL�ϡ��١����������󥯤����֥롼���С��������Ǹ��ڤ����Ƥ����ʤ����١��������Ȥϸ��ڤ��Ƥ��ʤ��ˡ�Olivier Coibion���ƥ��������������ƥ������ˡ�Yuriy Gorodnichenko��UC�С����졼�ˡ�Lorenz Kueng�ʥΡ����������������ˡ�John Silvia�������륺���ե������ˤ���ʸ��Innocent Bystanders? Monetary Policy and Inequality in the U.S.�פ��׻ݤ����Ѥ��Ƥ��롣

We study the effects of monetary policy shocks on—and their historical contribution to—consumption and income inequality in the United States since 1980 as measured by the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Contractionary monetary policy systematically increases inequality in labor earnings, total income, consumption and total expenditures. Furthermore, monetary policy shocks account for a non-trivial component of the historical cyclical variation in income and consumption inequality. Using detailed micro-level data on income and consumption, we document some of the different channels via which monetary policy shocks affect inequality, as well as how these channels depend on the nature of the change in monetary policy.

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�֥롼���С��������Ϥ�����ʸ�������ưʲ��Τ褦�˽񤤤Ƥ�����PGL�������ˡ�

Many economists remember a 1998 study by Christina and David Romer. It concluded that while expansionary monetary policy can reduce poverty in the short run by juicing economic growth, in the longer run everyone will benefit more from policies that aim for low and stable inflation because those measures improve the economy��s overall efficiency. Although it is true that high inflation in itself can sometimes disadvantage the poor -- the idea is that wealthier people are able to more-easily diversify their savings into assets less susceptible to inflation -- it��s only a small part of the story when it comes to the implications for monetary policy, according to Olivier Coibion, an economics professor at the University of Texas in Austin. In a recent study, Coibion and his co-authors found that over the period from 1980 to 2008, the inflation-as-regressive-tax argument was swamped by other benefits of accommodative monetary policy that pushed in the opposite direction, leading to a conclusion somewhat at odds with the Romers�� findings.

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¿�����кѳؼ��ϡ����ꥹ�ƥ����ʤȥǥӥåɡ�����������1998ǯ�θ����򵭲����Ƥ��롣���η��Ѥϡ���ĥŪ����ͻ�������к���Ĺ��¥����û��Ū�ˤ��Ϻ��򸺤餻�뤫�⤷���ʤ�����Ĺ��Ū�ˤ��㤯�ư��ꤷ�������ե�Ψ����ɸ�Ȥ����������鳧�����פ��롽�����������������к����Τθ�Ψ�������������Τǡ����Ȥ������Τ��ä����������ե����Τ��Τ��Ϻ����������Ȥʤ뤳�Ȥ������Τϻ��¤���������͵���ϼ�ʬ�����ߤ������ե��αƶ��������ˤ��������ˤ����ưפ�ʬ���Ǥ��뤿�᡽������ͻ�����ΰ�̣�Ȥ������ǤϤ������äΰ���ʬ�˲᤮�ʤ������ƥ��������������ƥ������кѳ��������Υ����ӥ��������ӥ����ϸ������Ƕ��θ����ǥ����ӥ����ȶ����Ԥ����ϡ�1980ǯ����2008ǯ�δ��֤ˤ����ơ������ե��ϵտ�Ū���ǤǤ����Ȥ�����ĥ�ϡ�����Ū����ͻ�������⤿�餹�����ʳ��ε��������رפˤ��äư�̣��̵���ʤäƤ������Ȥ������Ȥ򸫤��Ф��������η����ϡ����������׺ʤ�ȯ���Ȥϴ�ʬ̷�⤹�����ΤǤ��롣


���ʤߤ�PGL�ϰ��Ѥ��Ƥ��ʤ������֥롼���С��������Ϥ����ˡ��ե����ǥ��ե���Ϣ���������������κ�ǯ����ʸ��Nils Gornemann��FRB�ˡ�Keith Kuester�ʥܥ����ءˡ�Makoto Nakajima����Doves for the Rich, Hawks for the Poor? Distributional Consequences of Monetary Policy�סˤ����Ѥ��Ƥ��롣

Another recent study published by the Fed itself came to a similar conclusion, but went even further. For ��a majority of households�� in the study��s model of the economy, the benefits of a monetary policy strategy that focuses more on employment outweigh the associated costs that come in the form of higher and more volatile inflation.

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FRB���Ȥ��Ф����Ƕ����̤�������Ʊ�ͤη�����ã���Ƥ��ꡢ�ष��������Ƨ�߹����Ǥ��롣Ʊ�������к����ǥ��ˤ������ֲȷפ�����ʬ�פˤȤäơ������˽������֤���ͻ���������β��äϡ��⤯��ưŪ�������ե��Ȥ������Ǹ������տ�Ū�ʥ����Ȥ������롣

2017-05-19

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�Ȥ������ݤ�NBER��ʸ���ϥޡ����å����餬�񤤤Ƥ�������ʸ�Υ����ȥ��ϡ�Co-authorship in Economic History and Economics: Are We Any Different?�פǡ����Ԥ�Andrew Seltzer�������ɥ������ˡ�Daniel S. Hamermesh��Ʊ�ˡ�

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Over the last six decades articles published in leading economic history journals have been less likely to be co-authored than articles published in leading general economics journals. However, in both economic history and general economics journals there have been strong, monotonic increases in the number of authors per article and the fraction of co-authored papers. Economics and economic history differ in the nature of collaboration, in that co-authorships in economic history are more likely to be formed of individuals of different seniority as compared to economics generally.

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����60ǯ�֤��к��ˤΥȥå��ؽ����˽��Ǥ��줿��ʸ�ϡ��кѳ����̤Υȥå��ؽ����˽��Ǥ��줿��ʸ�����١�������ʸ�����ʤ������ˤ��ä����������ʤ��顢�к��ˤ��кѳ����̤��������ؽ����ˤ����ơ���ʸ�����������Կ��ʤ��Ӥ˶�����ʸ�γ����ϡ��϶���ñĴ�����ä��Ƥ������кѳ����к��ˤϡ��к��ˤ������кѳ����̤����������ΰ㤤���礭���Ŀ�Ʊ�Τ��Ȥ߹��碌�������䤹�����Ȥ������ǡ���Ư�����ʤ��ۤʤäƤ��롣

2017-05-18

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Autor���θ����ʹߡ��ǰ׼�ͳ���ΰ��ƶ��������뤳�Ȥ�ή�Ԥ��ˤʤ������������Ƥ��뤬�������������ƶ��Ȥ����Ⱥ������ä������夲��ɽ����NBER��ʸ���夬�äƤ�����ungated�ǡκ�ǯ����������WP���ˡ������ȥ��̤ꡢ�ƹ��ǤϤʤ��֥饸�����äǡ������ϡ�Economic Shocks and Crime: Evidence from the Brazilian Trade Liberalization�פȤʤäƤ��롣���Ԥ�Rafael Dix-Carneiro�ʥǥ塼�����ˡ�Rodrigo R. Soares���������ӥ����ˡ�Gabriel Ulyssea���ꥪ�ǥ����ͥ��������ȥ��å����ˡ�

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This paper studies the effect of changes in economic conditions on crime. We exploit the 1990s trade liberalization in Brazil as a natural experiment generating exogenous shocks to local economies. We document that regions exposed to larger tariff reductions experienced a temporary increase in crime following liberalization. Next, we investigate through what channels the trade-induced economic shocks may have affected crime. We show that the shocks had significant effects on potential determinants of crime, such as labor market conditions, public goods provision, and income inequality. We propose a novel framework exploiting the distinct dynamic responses of these variables to obtain bounds on the effect of labor market conditions on crime. Our results indicate that this channel accounts for 75 to 93 percent of the effect of the trade-induced shocks on crime.

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�ܹƤϡ��к��Ķ����Ѳ����Ⱥ���Ϳ�����ƶ��򸦵椹�롣�����Ǥϡ�1990ǯ�����֥饸�����ǰ׼�ͳ�������ϰ��к��˳���Ū�ʥ����å������������������¸��Ȥ������Ѥ��롣�桹���������̤ˤ����С��������������������������줿�ϰ��ϡ���ͳ�����˰���Ū���Ⱥ����ä��и����������˲桹�ϡ��ǰפ˵��������к������å����ɤη�ϩ���̤����Ⱥ��˱ƶ���������Ĵ�٤����桹�ϡ��������������å�����ϫƯ�Ծ��Ķ����������ζ����������ʺ��Ȥ��ä��Ⱥ�������Ū�ʷ����װ���ͭ���ʱƶ���Ϳ���뤳�Ȥ򼨤����桹�ϡ����������ѿ����줾����ư��Ūȿ�������Ѥ���ϫƯ�Ծ��Ķ����Ⱥ���Ϳ�����ƶ����ϰϤ���¬���뿷�������Ȥߤ��󼨤��롣�桹�η��̤ϡ����Ҥη�ϩ�����ǰפ˵������륷���å����Ⱥ��ؤαƶ���75��93%���������뤳�Ȥ򼨤��Ƥ��롣


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We show that deteriorations in labor market conditions in Brazil are strongly associated with increases in homicide rates, while the previous literature on developed countries found robust effects of labor market conditions only on property (non-violent) crime, and a zero effect on homicides.

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�桹�ϡ��֥饸����ϫƯ�Ծ��Ķ��ΰ����ϻ���ȯ��Ψ�ȶ��������դ��Ƥ��뤳�Ȥ򼨤������ʹ��ˤĤ��ƤΤ����ޤǤθ����Ǥϡ�ϫƯ�Ծ��Ķ������δ����ʱƶ��Ϻ⻺�ط�����˽���ˤ��Ⱥ����Ф��ƤΤ߸����Ф��졢���ͤؤαƶ��ϥ������ä���

2017-05-17

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�����ǾҲ𤷤�Autor���θ���������Ū�ȤǤ������٤�NBER��ʸ���夬�äƤ�������ʸ�Υ����ȥ��ϡ�Male Earnings, Marriageable Men, and Nonmarital Fertility: Evidence from the Fracking Boom�פǡ����Ԥ����꡼����������Melissa S. Kearney��Riley Wilson��

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There has been a well-documented retreat from marriage among less educated individuals in the U.S. and non-marital childbearing has become the norm among young mothers and mothers with low levels of education. One hypothesis is that the declining economic position of men in these populations is at least partially responsible for these trends. That leads to the reverse hypothesis that an increase in potential earnings of less-educated men would correspondingly lead to an increase in marriage and a reduction in non-marital births. To investigate this possibility, we empirically exploit the positive economic shock associated with localized ��fracking booms�� throughout the U.S. in recent decades. We confirm that these localized fracking booms led to increased wages for non-college-educated men. A reduced form analysis reveals that in response to local-area fracking production, both marital and non-marital births increase and there is no evidence of an increase in marriage rates. The pattern of results is consistent with positive income effects on births, but no associated increase in marriage. We compare our findings to the family formation response to the Appalachian coal boom experience of the 1970s and 1980s, when it appears that marital births and marriage rates increased, but non-marital births did not. This contrast potentially suggests important interactions between economic forces and social context.

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